Participatory Planning by Mobilized Citizens and Meddling Governments: Evidence From a Field Experiment in Rural Kenya

Ryan M. Sheely^{*} Assistant Professor of Public Policy Harvard Kennedy School of Government

Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, August 30-September 2, 2012

Abstract: In many parts of the world, governance reforms emphasizing decentralization and participatory democracy have led to the adoption of community-based local government planning institutions, in which citizens and civil society organizations work collaboratively with politicians and bureaucrats to set priorities for spending on local public goods projects. Despite the growing prevalence of this kind of institution, little is known about how the interactions between these various kinds of stakeholders shape the outcomes of such planning processes. In particular, it is uncertain whether the mobilization of citizens is effective in increasing their participation in these processes and whether participation in these processes actually leads to increased accountability in service delivery. In this paper, I assess the relationship between mobilization, participation, and the outcomes of community-based planning processes using a randomized field experiment in a rural local government in northern Kenya. In this experiment, half of the local government wards in the sample were randomly assigned to receive a treatment in which a local environmental NGO mobilized community members to attend a local government planning meeting and to publicly support the NGO's preferred public goods project at that meeting. Enumerators assessed the level of participation and meeting outcomes through structured observation of meetings, and supplemented these observations with administrative records of the actual project proposals that were submitted by the local government to the central government. The results of the experiment show that the NGO's mobilization had a large and significant effect on citizen participation in planning meetings, particularly in ethnically homogenous wards. This increased participation had no effect on the likelihood that the NGO's preferred project was funded or in the match between the projects selected at meetings and the final projects selected by the local government, but did cause a shift in the type of discrepancies observed in final allocations towards less visible types of interference by the local government.

^{*}Acknowledgements: Many thanks to Bill Clark, Michael Kremer, Amrita Ahuja, Vivian Hoffmann, Asim Khwaja, Rohini Pande, John Lonsdale, Ben Kipkorir, Jean Ensminger, Nahomi Ichino, Kimuli Kasara, Tara Grillos, Mai Hassan, and seminar participants at Harvard and Yale for comments on the research design and earlier presentations of the findings presented in this paper. Miguel Lavalle, Abel Oyuke, Richard Legei, Arnold Mwenda, Simon Macharia and Aletheia Donald contributed valuable research assistance at various stages of this project. This project was made possible in part by funding from the Sustainability Sciences Program at Harvard Kennedy School.

1. Introduction

As part of decentralization reforms throughout the 1990s, Kenya created a system of participatory planning institutions within elected local governments. One of the central aims of this institutional reform— known as the Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP)— was to give citizens greater direct influence over government provision of local public goods by allowing them to set local development priorities and choose between different types of public projects. This reform is part of a broader international trend towards the creation of "participatory" or "community-based" local government institutions that attempt to complement electoral accountability with more direct forms of participation in all phases of planning and implementing local government projects, including setting budgets, monitoring contracting and procurement, and actually building infrastructure and delivering public services (Fung and Olin Wright 2001; Mansuri and Rao 2004, 2012; Joshi and Moore 2004).

Although such institutional reforms have been touted as a way to substantively transform democratic governance, there are many empirical questions about the extent to which such reforms actually reconfigure relationships between citizens, civil society organizations, and elected representatives. Do participatory local government institutions actually ensure that government allocations match citizen priorities? How does mobilization by civil society organizations shape the outcomes of participatory planning processes?

In this paper, I provide an initial set of answers to these questions using a randomized field experiment conducted in a set of 14 electoral wards in the Laikipia County Council, a rural local government in north-central Kenya. Seven of the wards were randomly assigned to a treatment in which a local environmental NGO mobilized community members to attend the upcoming local government meeting and to publicly support the NGO's preferred public goods project at that meeting. Enumerators assessed the level of participation and meeting outcomes through structured observation of meetings in all treatment and control wards, and supplemented these observations with administrative records of the actual project proposals that were submitted by the local government to the central government.

There are three sets of findings from this experiment. First, the NGO mobilization had a significant and substantively large effect on the degree of citizen participation in local government meetings, as measured by the number of attendees, the number of local civil society organizations in attendance, and the length of the meeting. Second, despite the effect of the mobilization on turnout at the local government meeting, this turnout had no effect on the likelihood of the NGO's preferred project being chosen by citizens and no effect on the extent to which the local government actually allocated funding to the projects requested by citizens. Comparing the list of projects requested by citizens to the list of projects actually funded reveals that the exact projects requested by citizens were only funded in 2 of the 14 wards included in the experiment. Finally, although mobilization did not increase the match between citizen requests and actual project allocations, mobilization did have an effect on the specific tactics used by politicians to subvert the outcomes of participatory meetings, causing a push towards less visible forms of interference. Taken together, these results indicate that substantial, sustained, and broad-based mobilization and transparency efforts may be necessary if participatory local government institutions are to have a sustained effect on the allocation of public projects.

This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I provide a brief history of local government in Kenya and on the history and operation of the LASDAP institution. Next, I outline a conceptual framework for thinking about the relationship between mobilization by NGOs, citizen participation, and the outcomes of community-based planning meetings, and synthesize a variety of theoretical approaches to develop a set of testable hypotheses. I then describe the design of the LASDAP mobilization experiment, focusing on the design of the intervention, the method used to randomly assigning wards to the treatment and control conditions, and the framework for measurement and analysis. I then present the results of the experiment, focusing first on the effects of mobilization on participation, and then examining the effects of mobilization-induced participation on capture, match with citizen preferences, and the prevalence of types of discrepancies between requested and allocated projects. I conclude by briefly considering the theoretical, policy, and methodological implications of these empirical findings.

2. Local Government and Participatory Planning in Kenya

2.1 The History of Local Government in Kenya

The initial seeds of elected local government in Kenya were the town and county councils that governed European-occupied localities during the colonial period (Wood and Southall 1996). In the late colonial period, there was an effort to extend similar forms of elected local government to the rest of the colony, in the form of "African District Councils" (ADCs) (Kipkorir 2009). The colonial government had multiple goals in the creation of ADCs: decentralizing the provision of some basic public services, defusing and co-opting resistance, and providing a tutelary training ground in democratic governance for the local elites that would enable them to play a larger role policy formation and implementation, eventually culminating in independence.

As Kenya's independence moved from being a gradual transition to an imminent reality in the early 1960s, the system of ADCs spread throughout the colony, and were included Kenya's first post-independence constitution, with the plan of folding them into the existing county and urban councils. In particular, the ADCs and town and county councils were merged and assigned governance functions according to the "Local Government Act", which created four distinct types of local authorities. County councils are the local authorities that serve rural areas, while city, town, and municipal councils serve urban areas of varying size and scope (Southall and Wood 1996; Kibua and Mwabu 2008). All of these local authorities are divided into wards, with each ward electing a councilor in elections that are held every five years.

The post-independence constitution envisioned a two-tiered federal system of government, with provinces (majimbo) as the first tier of devolved government, and county governments as the lowest tier (Kipkorir 2009). In this constitutional order, it was envisioned that provincial assemblies would have substantial power over taxation and setting policies, while county and urban councils were envisioned to play a role in the delivery of basic public services. However, shortly after independence, President Jomo Kenyatta's government started to reconcentrate power in the central government, rolling back the power of both tiers of devolved government (Anderson 2005, Kipkorir 2009, Wood and Southall 1996). The provincial assemblies were scrapped along with the declaration of the republic in 1965, effectively halting Kenya's trajectory towards a federal state (Anderson 2005; Gertzel 1970).

Although the county councils were not formally abrogated in this way, their effectiveness and autonomy was gradually undermined throughout the 1960s by the central government, which increasingly sought to remove powers from county councils, overturn decisions, and where possible, shift responsibility towards bureaucrats appointed by the central government. As politics shifted to first de facto single party rule, and later to de jure single party rule under Daniel arap Moi, the ruling KANU party played an increasingly important role in influencing county council elections, with local Members of Parliament playing a particularly important role in influencing the outcomes of local elections the and central party officials using nominated councilor appointments to counterbalance local factional politics as necessary (Wood and Southall 1996; Widner 1992).

As a result, in a span of less than 20 years, nearly all independent authority and policymaking power was stripped from local governments, and they were largely turned into another conduit for KANU's politics of control. It was during this time that local governments became synonymous with graft and incompetence on one hand and inflated budgets and deficits on the other. Although the introduction of multiparty elections in 1992 broke KANU's stranglehold on power in many Local Authorities, the introduction of political competition did not necessarily have a transformative effect on the effectiveness of these bodies (Wood and Southall 1996). Across the country, their resource base remained low, in part due to limited revenue collection and de facto limits to political competition and accountability. In many areas, KANU continued to intervene in local elections and in the appointment of nominated councilors and council bureaucrats.

2.2 The Local Authority Transfer Fund Reforms

As a result of the continued disappointing performance of Kenya's local governments in the wake of the reintroduction of multiparty elections, a number of Kenya's major donors started to supplement their requests for further governance

- 5 -

reforms at the national level with a package of reforms designed to jointly increase the financial viability, capacity, and accountability of local governments. This external pressure, combined with demands for reform from opposition parties and civil society, resulted in a package of reforms that were introduced in 1998. The most substantial reform was the creation of the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF), which was designed to increase the funds available to local governments, while simultaneously introducing accountability mechanisms to ensure that the increased resources translated to improved service delivery. The legislation earmarked five percent of the total national income tax revenues for the transfer fund, which was to be increased gradually over time (Kibua and Mwabu 2008).

While the broad contours of the reform are outlined in the authorizing legislation, which was passed into law in 1998, the legislation gave the Ministry of Finance the authority to develop the more detailed rules and processes governing the operation of the Fund. The finance ministry articulated these rules in 1999 as the "Local Authorities Transfer Fund Regulations", which established the detailed framework for the transfer fund. In particular, the regulations detail three critical elements of the LATF program: 1) the categories of expenditures from the transfer fund, 2) the criteria for establishing the amount of transfers to each local authority, and 3) the requirements for reporting and documentation for the fund.

The LATF regulations stipulated a variety of requirements for how the resources could be spent, in accordance with the fund's stated purpose of helping local authorities to reduce public debt, improve the quality of service delivery, and increase the quality of their financial management. In particular, the regulations separated the fund into three different accounts- the service delivery account, the performance account (which was further subdivided into a regular performance and high performance account), and a transitional account. The service delivery account was envisioned to be the largest component of the fund, and the regulations further stipulated that at least 65% of the annual disbursement to that account had to be allocated to capital expenses. (LATF Regulations 1999).

The LATF regulations also specified that a set of "objective criteria" that were to be used to determine the amount of allocations to local authorities (LATF Regulations 1998, Regulation 20). This stipulation was an attempt to ensure that the funds were distributed in a way to help reduce historical disparities between regions of Kenya and to remove discretion over targeting the fund from politicians. The regulations identified relative population as the main criterion that was to be used in determining the amount of LATF allocations for each local authority, but also indicated that other criteria that measured demand for service delivery could be used, such as poverty and urbanization.

Finally, the LATF regulations set out a set of criteria of the types of documentation that would be used by the central government to monitor the use of LATF funds and determine each Local Authority's eligibility to receive both the servicedelivery and performance-based disbursements. The vision of these reporting requirements was to gradually increase the rigor of the reporting over time, allowing local governments to initially become accustomed to the new processes of planning and reporting the use of LATF funds, and then demanding more details and documentation as experience with and capacity for utilizing LATF resources expanded.

2.3 LASDAP- From Top Down Monitoring to Participatory Planning

As part of the required documentation, the LATF regulations stipulated that each local authority must submit a **"A Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan setting out the Authority's plans for the improvement of local services... in accordance with regulations issued by the minister for the time being responsible for local authorities"** (LATF Regulations 1998). This initial formulation of the Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) focused on attempting to ensure top-down accountability by requiring that local authorities commit to using LATF funds for explicit capital expenditure projects, providing a framework for audits and monitoring by the MoLG, and ensuring that transfer funds don't simply serve as a tool to expand patronage-based employment.

However, when the Ministry of Local Government articulated the LASDAP regulations, it specified that residents of the local authority needed to be incorporated in the process of articulating the list of capital projects to be implemented in each ward in the local authority in the coming year. In this way, the ministry of local government transformed the LASDAP process from a top-down accountability mechanism into a bottom-up participatory planning institution. As a result, administration and support for the LASDAP process is one of the major tasks of the Ministry of Local Government, and the mechanism has become one of the central ways in which many Kenyans engage with local government representatives and bureaucrats.

As Figure 1 indicates, the full LASDAP cycle, which runs from September to December of every year, attempts ensure a balance of citizen participation, technical evaluation by county council bureaucrats, and political deliberation by councilors. Throughout September and October, one public LASDAP consultation meeting is held in each ward in every Local Authority in Kenya. Notice of these meetings is meant to be distributed to citizens one month before the scheduled meeting in their ward, and on the date of the planning meetings, all citizens who are in attendance are allowed to suggest public projects that they would like built in their ward in the upcoming fiscal year. If there are multiple projects suggested, the two most frequently requested projects will be identified as the ward's priority projects, and these two projects will be forwarded to the council headquarters, along with the full ranked list of all projects suggested by the attendees. These meetings are facilitated by county council bureaucrats, and are attended by the councilor of that ward.

The projects identified in the ward consultation meetings are then forwarded to the county council's technical committee, which is chaired by the county engineer, who is appointed by the Ministry of Local Government. The technical committee then assesses the feasibility of the projects proposed in the consultation meetings and makes any necessary modifications or suggestions. The full list of approved projects from all wards in the local authority are then brought to a consensus meeting in the local authority headquarters, which brings together all elected and nominated councilors, the technical committee, and citizen representatives and civil society groups from each ward. The purpose of the consensus meeting is for citizens to voice any concerns regarding changes suggested by the technical committee, for the technical committee to respond, and for councilors and citizen groups to dialogue about the overall allocation of projects between wards, and to ensure that the total slate of projects fits within the local authority's allocated budget for that year. After the consensus meeting, the list of proposed projects are then forwarded to a full council meeting, in which the councilors vote on the list of proposed projects and incorporate them into the full Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan, which is then forwarded to the Ministry of Local Government by early December. The Ministry then reviews the LASDAP submission along with the other performance criteria, and if all criteria are met, starts disbursement of the LATF funds (Kibua and Mwabu 2008).

3. Theory and Observable Implications

Figure 2 outlines a theoretical framework that links the causes and consequences of participation in community-based planning exercises such as the LASDAP. The first step in this causal chain is the linkage between mobilization by civil society groups and participation in planning processes. The theoretical importance of this hypothesis stems from the fact that political participation— both voting in elections, as well as participation in community-based planning institutions— generates positive externalities (Ostrom 1998; De Rooij et al 2009). Thus, although the first-order social dilemma underpinning problems of public goods provision by governments is a principal-agent problem, this hypothesis goes one step further to show that the act of holding politicians accountable also entails a collective action problem. If this is the case, widespread social mobilization may help to solve this collective action problem, either as a focal point allowing coordination around a high participation equilibrium or by creating or activating social norms that recognize participation as a valuable activity (Gerber and Green 2000; Gerber et al. 2008).

The causal pathway linking mobilization and political participation potentially interacts with community-level institutions that solve the collective action problems associated with providing and maintaining other kinds of local public goods. In particular, rules, norms, and shared strategies that increase individuals' intrinsic or extrinsic incentives to engage in collective action should have a synergistic effect with explicit mobilization aimed at increasing political participation. In the context of mobilization for LASDAP meetings in Laikipia, the major types of institution that may play this role are norms and networks within ethnic groups (Habyarimana et al. 2007, 2009; Miguel and Gugerty 2005). Thus, in addition to the main effect of mobilization on participation in LASDAP meetings, this mobilization should have a larger effect on participation in localities that are ethnically homogenous.

The second step in the conceptual framework developed here is between citizen participation and the outcomes of community-based planning processes. Although there are relatively few theories that explicitly seek to explain the linkage between citizen participation and the outcomes of community-based planning, it is possible to derive three alternative hypotheses by drawing of a variety of other prominent theoretical perspectives in political economy and comparative politics.

One such theory that can generate hypotheses linking mobilization and the outcomes of participatory planning processes comes from the large literature linking collective action and **interest groups** (Olson 1971; Mitchell and Munger 1991). The central argument of this perspective is that although mobilization has the potential to create incentives for politicians to provide public goods, organizations that have the capacity to mobilize individuals in this was also have the capacity to utilize that mobilization to influence public policies and funds to match their own preferences and priorities.

This argument has been developed within a long tradition of research on interest groups, which argues that small groups with concentrated interests have the capacity to use collective action to capture public resources (Olson 1971; Bates 1984). This use of mobilization to capture participatory planning processes or other types of political participation can be the result of the tendency of groups to only mobilize their supporters, rather than mobilizing the broader community. Alternatively, it could be the case that mobilization, either through face-to-face interactions or through media messaging allows interest groups to persuade citizens to support the group's preferred policies and projects over other options, by either changing preferences or by framing or priming the relative salience of particular policy dimensions or choices (Smith 2000; Habermas 2006; Chong and Druckman 2007).

If either of these mechanisms is at work in the case of LASDAP institutions, we would expect to observe that mobilization by a single interest group has the effect of

increasing the match between the interest group's preferred bundle of public projects and the projects selected at the ward meetings and sent by councilors to the ministry of local government. In contrast, the finding that mobilization by an interest group does not increase the match between that group's preferred bundle and citizen expressions of preferences would indicate that in at least some contexts, public mobilization by interest groups may not necessarily automatically lead to capture of political participation by interest groups. Although this would be far from definitive evidence against interest group models of politics, such a negative finding would motivate a closer examination of the circumstances under which political mobilization can serve private versus public purposes, and the types of institutions that can help ensure that political mobilization by interest groups may interact with community-level institutions, in ways similar to those predicted by the other theoretical perspectives discussed above. In the context of the LASDAP, the ability of interest groups to capture ward meetings should be highest in wards that are dominated by one ethnic group

The second theoretical perspective that can be used to derive hypotheses about the linkage between citizen participation and the outcomes of community-based planning comes from theories that emphasize **information asymmetries and accountability**. The framing of principal-agent problems as the core social dilemma undergirding public goods provision and replenishment by governments rests on two related types of information asymmetries between politicians and citizens. On the one hand, politicians may not have a full understanding of how their electoral mandate translates into specific allocations of public projects. Although models of representative democracy assume that election outcomes delegate policymaking authority by aggregating and signaling citizen preferences, the clear correspondence between electoral outcomes and policy outcomes breaks down when there are multiple policy dimensions over which citizens have preferences (Roemer 2006). In real world political contexts, especially in developing countries, the existence of multiple policy dimensions and political cleavages that do not map clearly on to programmatic divisions makes the electoral signal extremely noisy for both politicians and voters, decreasing the likelihood that politicians either promise or implement bundles of public goods that maximize social welfare (Keefer and Khemani 2005).

The second, and more frequently noted, information asymmetry is that citizens fail to perfectly observe politician effort. This gap limits the ability of citizens to use the ballot box to hold politicians accountable by driving a wedge between politician performance, public goods outcomes, and voter decision-making. This can exacerbate the trend created by politicians' imperfect understanding of citizen preferences. Politicians' lack of information may lead them to use their discretion in implementing projects, which in turn may increase the likelihood that they either fail to implement the citizens' preferred bundle of policies and simply implement their preferred project or that they use the public funds for private purposes.

These two types of informational problems interact with one another to lead to outcomes in which public goods provision and maintenance are suboptimal. Conversely, building on the first stage of the chain of implications of the public goods maintenance theory, increased citizen participation in participatory planning exercises should have the effect of mitigating these informational problems, leading to public goods allocations that are ultimately closer to citizens' preferences. In the specific context of the LASDAP institutions, this leads to the hypothesis that increased citizen participation in the ward planning meetings will lead to a closer match between the projects requested by citizens and the actual allocation of projects by the county council. As noted in the literature review above, this hypothesis is one of the core prongs of the theory of change that undergirds the design of many participatory planning institutions— increased citizen participation in development and local government planning should lead to allocations of projects that are closer to citizen preferences (Mansuri and Rao 2004; Olken 2010).

A third theoretical perspective that links the effects of citizen participation and the outcomes of community-based local government planning emphasizes the linkages between **power and institutions** (Moe 2005, Evans 2005, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). The framing of the principal agent problem as a dual information problem reveals that policies that increase citizen participation in planning processes most strongly address the first of the informational problems, assuming that politicians wish to serve as faithful delegates of their constituents but lack accurate information about the distribution of preferences over public projects. However, in the event that politicians seize on information asymmetries to capture public projects for their private aims, it is not clear that increased citizen participation in planning meetings alone will necessarily allow citizens to exert control over politicians. Although these meetings may help to generate common knowledge about what is expected of the politician, politician performance of these duties will take place over a long period of time, in which their actions will frequently be less visible to their constituents. Moreover, politicians may be able to use their position to change the de jure and de facto rules and norms structuring the allocation of public funds, allowing them to circumvent increased scrutiny by inventing new ways of maintaining control over the process of allocating public funds (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). The observable implication of this theoretical perspective is that increased citizen participation in planning processes will not lead to a better match between citizen preferences and public allocations, but that instead politicians will go to greater lengths to conceal their interference, due to the slightly higher public scrutiny over the planning process.

4. Experiment Design and Data

4.1 The LASDAP Mobilization Field Experiment

To provide a preliminary test of the observable implications of this theoretical framework, I designed a small-scale randomized field experiment that was implemented during the LASDAP planning processes in one of Kenya's rural Local Authorities— the Laikipia County Council— for the 2009-2010 fiscal year.

The choice of Laikipia as the site for this experiment was driven by my extensive prior experience conducting ethnographic fieldwork, randomized field experiments, and community mobilization in the region in 2006 and 2007 (Sheely, Forthcoming). In particular, during the course of conducting interviews and participant observation in rural villages throughout the region, I worked with my research assistants, translators, and their friends and families to start the SAFI Project, an NGO focused on solid waste management and environmental education. During the fall of 2007, my Kenyan research team and I designed and implemented the SAFI project's first communitybased waste management program as a randomized field experiment that was designed to assess the effect of community mobilization and monitoring by government and traditional institutions on collective action and littering behavior (Sheely 2012a; Sheely 2012b). There were four interrelated components of the SAFI Project Community Waste Management Program: 1) Mobilization of community members for a community cleanup day, 2) education about the negative effects of public waste and littering, 3) provision of trash cans and storage pits, and 4) creating and training volunteer committees to manage trash collection (Sheely 2012b).

Following the completion of the pilot program's implementation in treatment villages in 2007, SAFI's community facilitators continued to collect data on trash accumulation and littering behavior and to work with community members to start small businesses aimed at waste management and recycling. During this time, both the quantitative data and qualitative observations by SAFI's staff indicated that although the program had been successful in reducing littering behavior, the effect of the intervention on the level of trash in rural centers decreased over the long-term. Interviews, focus groups, and participant observation indicated that the return to increased levels of public waste in treatment villages was due to two factors: 1) degradation of the trash cans that SAFI had provided and 2) inability of the volunteer trash committees to adequately provide all of the necessary labor to collect and dispose of public waste.

These two interconnected factors led SAFI's staff to decide that long-term maintenance of its community-based waste management program would require combining its volunteer efforts and fundraising from international donors with ongoing financial support for infrastructure and labor by the Laikipia County Council. Given that the LASDAP process was explicitly designed to provide a venue for citizens and community groups to communicate problems to the county council and obtain funding for public projects to solve those problems, SAFI decided to mobilize members of the communities where it had worked to attend the LASDAP meetings in their ward and to request funding for waste management, including the provision of durable trash bins and a salary for local waste collectors. SAFI's plan to mobilize citizens in its communities gave me the unique opportunity to design a randomized field experiment that could provide evidence necessary to adjudicate between the competing theoretical explanations linking mobilization and citizen participation in community-based planning. At the same time, randomly assigning wards to receive SAFI's mobilization campaign allowed me to provide SAFI with evidence about whether mobilizing communities to attend the LASDAP meetings was an effective use of the organization's limited staff and resources.

Building on the competing hypotheses outlined above, the core treatment in this field experiment was the SAFI project's efforts to mobilize residents of centers in its program area to participate in their ward's LASDAP consultation meeting. As with the waste management experiment, the design of the intervention was a collaborative process between myself and the SAFI project's staff— they developed the mobilization strategy and curriculum based on their organizational goals and expertise, and I provided input focused on linking these goals to the central research questions and hypotheses. Through this process, we decided that the core of this community mobilization program was for SAFI project facilitators and committees to educate community members about the LASDAP/LATF process, to encourage members to come to LASDAP meetings in their ward, and to suggest that these community members identify sanitation as a priority for their ward and to support investments in a package of sanitation infrastructure (trash bins, trash sorting/storage plots, and public pit latrines) and services (paying for a designated public sanitation worker to collect and dispose of trash and maintain infrastructure).

SAFI agreed to have its program coordinators train its network of facilitators to implement the mobilization protocol in the wards randomly assigned to the treatment group. Each facilitator in the treatment group was assigned to mobilize 30 households in their center (and the surrounding area), focusing on a mix of individuals who were active in community organization, as well as less involved residents. In all of the treatment wards, SAFI project staff contacted the local councilors and secured permission to mobilize community members for the meeting and to attend and observe the meeting; in the control wards, the staff obtained permission to attend the meetings. For each treatment ward, the mobilization window was three days before the meeting in a given ward.

4.2 Sample Size and Randomization

Although the ability to link the LASDAP mobilization experiment to the SAFI project's previous activities and sample has several analytic and operational benefits, this empirical strategy's major downside is sample size and statistical power. As discussed elsewhere (Sheely 2012b), this was also the key weakness of the SAFI project anti-littering experiment, which implemented three treatments in a sample of 36 centers in Laikipia. Although this strategy led to a variety of statistically significant and substantively interesting findings (Sheely 2012a), there are two reasons why these problems are intensified by using this same sample to evaluate the impact of mobilization on citizen participation and LASDAP outcomes.

First, during the initial SAFI project experiment, trash and littering data were collected weekly, and centers were randomly assigned to two different things: 1) treatment groups and 2) implementation dates, which were spread over a 6 month period. This research design made it possible to leverage both temporal and spatial variation to counterbalance the loss of power associated with the small sample size. However, given that the LASDAP process only takes place once annually, it was not feasible to track citizen participation and public goods outcomes over time in the same way. Second, the fact that county councils use electoral wards as the smallest geographic unit for LASDAP activities places an additional constraint on the sample size. Wards are much larger geographic areas than centers, meaning that implementing the LASDAP experiment in wards that contain the 36 centers used in the initial experiment results in a sample of 12 wards, which could be expanded to 14 by incorporating wards without SAFI project centers but which are directly adjacent to SAFI's area of operation.

In order to increase precision given the small sample, the fourteen wards were blocked into pairs using two criteria: 1) number of SAFI centers and 2) ethnic heterogeneity. First, the sample of wards was divided into three blocks, based on the number of SAFI villages in each ward: 1) Wards with no SAFI centers (2 wards); 2) Wards with 1-3 SAFI centers (8 wards); and 3) Wards with 4 or more SAFI villages (4 wards). Within these blocks, I grouped the wards into pairs, based on qualitative measures of whether the ethnic composition of the wards were primarily comprised by members of one tribe or was ethnically heterogeneous. I then randomly assigned one ward within each blocked pair to receive the mobilization treatment, and assigned the other ward to the control condition of no mobilization (Table 1).

4.3 Measurement and Data

The observable implications of the various theoretical perspectives discussed above meant that it was crucial to measure three key outcomes: 1) the level of citizen participation in the meetings, 2) the SAFI project's success at obtaining funding for its preferred projects, and 3) the match between the projects requested by the citizens and the projects actually allocated by the county council. Given the focus of these observable implications on the behavior of citizens and politicians, the primary strategy for measuring these three types of outcomes was to combine structured observation of behavior in the ward meetings with collection of publicly available administrative records. In particular, citizen behavior was measured through systematic, structured participant observation of the LASDAP consultation meetings in all 14 wards included in the sample. In addition to observing the role played by politicians in the ward meetings, politician behavior was also to be measured by attending and observing the consensus and full-council meetings and collecting the minutes from those meetings and the official project documents forwarded by the county council to the Ministry of Local Government.

In order to facilitate the systematic observation of the meetings, I worked with SAFI's staff to develop an observation sheet, which provided guidelines of how to record each of the indicators, and spaces in which to write them down. The level and nature of citizen participation was measured with three distinct types of measures. First, the coordinator counted the number of citizens attending the meeting, both overall and disaggregated by gender, and also counted total the number of organized civil society groups represented at the meeting, disaggregated by organization type. Second, the coordinator tracked every speech by citizens, and classified each citizen speech by which policy area/public project they prioritized. Finally, the coordinator recorded the total length of the meeting from start to finish.

In addition to providing multiple measures of citizen participation, these measures can also be used to construct measures of public goods capture and allocation. To measure capture of the LASDAP process by SAFI, the observers recorded the number and proportion of citizens speaking in favor of waste management as the major problem in the ward and the overall rank of sanitation in the meeting outcomes and final list. To measure the match between citizen preferences and actual project allocations by the county council, the coordinators recorded the top two projects agreed to by the ward meeting participants, along with the full ranking of all projects in the ward, which then can be compared with the official list of projects forwarded by the Laikipia County Council to the Ministry of Local Government.

4.4 Analysis

The framework for analyzing the data from the LASDAP mobilization experiment is influenced jointly by the randomized block design of the experiment and the multistage nature of the theoretical framework for understanding mobilization and participation developed above. Because wards were assigned to the treatment or control group within pairs, it is necessary to account for this blocking when analyzing the data to avoid inflating the standard errors (Duflo et al 2007, McKenzie and Bruhn 2009, Green and Gerber 2012). As a result, in each regression, dummy variables will be included for each pair other than the Gituamba-Kinamba pair, which will be the reference category.

To assess the observable implications of step 1 of the theoretical framework described above, the various measures of participation will each be regressed on a dummy variable coded 1 if the ward was assigned to the treatment group and 0 if it was assigned to the control group. To assess the implications of step 2 of the framework, the measures of Project Capture and Project Match are regressed on meeting attendance, instrumenting for mobilization using two-stage least squares. This modeling choice reflects the structure of the theoretical framework developed above, with the random assignment of wards to mobilization making it possible to identify the effect of attendance on Project Capture and Project Match outcomes. For each of the steps, the alternative implications concerning the interaction between mobilization and ethnic heterogeneity will be assessed in two ways: 1) by examining the size and significance of the coefficients associated with each pair, and 2) by estimating alternative specifications for each model that include a dummy variable for the ethnic composition of the ward (coded o if the ward is ethnically homogenous and 1 if it is ethnically heterogeneous), as well as the interaction between ethnic composition and the mobilization treatment.

5. Results

5.1 Effects of Mobilization on Patterns of Participation

Column 1 of Table 2 shows the effect of mobilization on various measures of citizen participation in consultation meetings in the sample of wards included in the LASDAP field experiment, with mobilization increasing attendance by just over 40 people. On average, 82.71 individuals attended LASDAP meetings in wards randomly assigned to receive the mobilization treatment, in contrast to an average of 42.57 individuals in wards in the control group (Figure 3). Columns 2-5 indicate that mobilization has no statistically significant effect on the number of community groups in attendance, the proportion of meeting participants that are female, the number of citizens that participated in the meeting, and the proportion of meeting attendees that participated. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that mobilization also has a significant effect on the duration of the meeting, increasing the meeting by an average of just over one hour. Columns 2-3 show that although the direct effect of attendance on meeting duration is small and not statistically significant, using mobilization as an instrument for meeting attendance indicates that for each additional meeting attendee, the length of the meeting increased by an average of one minute. In addition to the effect of mobilization and attendance, meeting duration appears to have varied systematically across types of wards, with the ethnically homogenous wards with few SAFI centers lasting over an hour less long than average.

Breaking these results out by the level of ethnic heterogeneity brings even greater nuance to these findings. Figure 5 indicates that the effect of mobilization appears to be

driven by the interaction between mobilization and ethnic heterogeneity, consistent with the theory developed above, although Column 1 of Table 4 indicates that while these effects are substantively large, they are not statistically significant. However, after controlling for ethnic composition and the interaction between ethnic composition and mobilization, the point estimate of the effect of mobilization on meeting attendance increases to 53.40. Figure 6 and Column 2 of Table 4 reveal that the turnout of community groups at the ward meeting is also mediated by ethnic heterogeneity, albeit in the opposite direction. That is, in ethnically heterogeneous wards, mobilization more than doubles the number of citizen groups that are represented at the meeting, whereas in homogenous wards, there is no effect on the average number of groups. This finding is echoed in Table 5, which indicates that although heterogeneous wards tended to have shorter meetings on average, mobilization increased meetings in these wards by 2 hours.

These results provide support for the theoretical framework developed above, while also introducing new puzzles. On the one hand, the substantively large and statistically significant effects of mobilization on meeting attendance and duration indicates that SAFI's mobilization efforts succeeded in nearly doubling the attendance at meetings, and that by and large those attendees participated at the same rate as in control wards, leading to longer meetings on average in mobilization wards. Furthermore, the fact that ethnic heterogeneity dampens the effect of mobilization on attendance generally supports the hypothesis that ethnic heterogeneity exacerbates the collective action problems associated with political participation, and that mobilization is not sufficient to overcome these problems. On the other hand, the opposite mediating effect of ethnic diversity on the number of civil society groups represented at LASDAP meetings deepens and qualifies this finding, indicating that ethnic heterogeneity does not imply an absence of civic organizations, and that mobilization in such wards increases the number of civil society groups in attendance at those meetings.

One possible interpretation of the increased civil society presence in ethnically homogenous wards is that in such wards, civil society groups are formed along ethnic lines, with the possibility that each of the ethnic groups has its own community associations. The findings indicate that although the mobilization was successful in ensuring that more groups attended the meeting, mobilization was less effective at encouraging increased attendance by the rank and file constituencies of these groups. One possible interpretation of this finding is that due to the intensified collective action problems associated with political participation in ethnically diverse wards, mobilization serves to enable community organizations to act more effectively as interest groups rather than directly empowering citizens. Although assessing the empirical validity of this interpretation is well beyond the scope of this data and analysis, analyzing the patterns associated with SAFI capture of projects makes it possible to start to investigate the extent to which civil society mobilizations of citizens can be explained through the lens of interest group theories of politics.

5.2 Effects of Mobilization and Participation on Project Capture

The evidence above indicates support for the key observational implication of step one of the theoretical framework developed in this paper- mobilization by the SAFI project increased participation in LASDAP consultation meetings by both citizens and community groups. Although this finding does have deeper theoretical implications for our understanding of political participation as a collective action problem, the bigger question of theoretical and practical importance is what kind of impact mobilization by civil society groups has on the outcomes of community-based planning institutions. This is in part because, as discussed above, existing theories of political economy and political participation produce competing hypotheses about the effects of increased citizen participation on the outcomes of participatory planning processes embedded in local governments.

Applied to the case of the LASDAP Mobilization Experiment, the interest-group theories of politics summarized above predict that SAFI's mobilization campaign will lead to an increased probability of SAFI's preferred bundle of solid waste management project being selected at ward consultation meetings. Even a casual examination of the projects selected by citizens in ward meetings indicates that SAFI's mobilization of citizens to participate in the LASDAP meetings had no such effect on the projects selected by citizens (Table 6). Waste management was selected as one of the two ward projects in only one of the seven wards in which it mobilized citizens. What is noteworthy about this ward- Umande ward in Laikipia East- is that it is an ethnically homogenous ward with many SAFI centers. One possible interpretation of the success of SAFI's mobilization campaign in this ward vis- à -vis the other treatment wards is that ethnic homogeneity and extensive prior community engagement are jointly necessary for civil society organizations to capture participatory planning processes.

Although SAFI's mobilization led to the selection of its preferred project in only one ward, looking more closely at the effect of the treatment on the number of citizens supporting waste management and the overall rank of waste management in the list of proposed projects is necessary to evaluate the implications of interest group theories of mobilization in more detail. Table 7 indicates that there is no direct relationship between mobilization and either the number or proportion of meeting attendees supporting waste management as their preferred project, which is consistent with the finding that this project was chosen in very few wards. However, columns 3 and 5 of Table 7 indicate that attendance has an effect on the number of individuals supporting solid waste management projects, which is robust to using mobilization as an instrument for meeting attendance.

The practical implication of this point estimate is that the average increase in meeting attendance of approximately 40 individuals in treatment wards leads to on average around 5 more individuals supporting waste management projects than in control wards. Column 6 indicates that the effect of attendance (using mobilization as instrument) on the proportion of meeting attendees supporting waste management just falls short of conventional levels of statistical significance. The interpretation of the point estimate is that a mobilization-induced increase in 40 individuals attending the meeting leads to a 2 percentage point increases in the proportion of meeting attendees supporting SAFI's proposal, vis- à -vis the wards in the control group.

This pattern of statistically significant but substantively modest effects of mobilization-induced participation on support for SAFI's projects is also echoed by analyzing the effects of treatment on the overall rank of solid waste management projects among all projects proposed by participants in the consultation meeting (Table 8). As above, the direct effect of mobilization on the rank of solid waste projects is not statistically significant, but regressing project rank on attendance (both alone, and instrumenting for mobilization) indicates that mobilization-induced attendance has a small, but significant effect on the ranking of SAFI's preferred projects. The practical implication of this point estimate is that 80 additional meeting attendees are necessary in order to move solid waste one position closer to first place in the final ranking, which is roughly double the average number of additional citizens who attended consultation meetings as a result of SAFI's mobilization.

An additional pattern in many of the results in Tables 7 and 8 is that the substantive size and significance of the coefficients of the dummy variables for the paired groups dwarf the effects of mobilization-induced attendance. The significance of the coefficent for the indicator for the Muhotetu-Umande pair in Columns 1 and 5 of Table 7 indicates that on average the two wards in this pair— which were ethnically homogenous and had many SAFI centers— had substantially more sanitation supporters than other wards. This pattern is consistent with the finding that Umande was the only ward in which waste management projects were prioritized. Thus, even in the control ward in this pair— Muhotetu— ethnic homogeneity and higher density of prior interaction with SAFI leads to a level of support for solid waste projects comparable to the support observed in the treatment wards in other pairs, which is larger relative to other control wards, but is not sufficient to lead waste management to be one of the top two projects. Similarly, it is only from this highly favorable set of starting conditions that SAFI's mobilization in Umande ward was then effective in ensuring that waste management was selected.

As Table 8 indicates, interpreting the pair-specific coefficients in the regressions on the ranking of solid waste is less straightforward. Although the coefficient for the dummy variable indicating the Umande-Muhotetu pair is statistically significant, indicating a tendency for sanitation to be ranked more highly in that pair, the same pattern holds for the pair of homogenous wards with some centers in Laikipia North, and the two pairs with heterogeneous ethnic composition. This indicates that there is substantial inter-pair heterogeneity in the overall importance of waste management in meetings, and that this heterogeneity is only partially related to citizen support for sanitation. In particular, as confirmed by Table 9, which includes the the dummy variable for ethnically heterogeneous wards and the interaction between heterogeneity and the mobilization treatment, sanitation was likely to be ranked two positions closer to first place in ethnically heterogeneous wards vis- à -vis homogenous wards. One interpretation of this pattern is that because solid waste management is in higher demand in ethnically heterogeneous wards, regardless of SAFI mobilization or intensity of prior SAFI activity, perhaps due to a greater salience of public waste problems in such wards.

Taken together, these findings indicate that the participation induced by SAFI's mobilization program did increase the number of participants supporting the organization and the rank of the organization's preferred projects, but that the size of these effects was not enough to significantly change the likelihood that waste management projects would be selected by meeting participants. The main reason that increased participation in favor of SAFI did not directly lead to the organization capturing the LASDAP process in treatment wards is that the increased attendance caused by SAFI's mobilization did not translate directly into supporters. This may be in part due to the fact that even if supporters promised SAFI that they would attend the meeting and request waste management project, there was no incentive to keep that promise when they attended the meeting.

These findings square with Mancur Olson's application of his theory of collective action to interest group mobilization- large groups will be subject to substantial free rider problems in absence of selective incentives that are able to reward group members for participation (Olson 1971). The larger literature on coethnicity and collective action indicates that norms and shared strategies within ethnic groups can also help to facilitate such collective action (Habyarimana et al 2008). The fact that the only ward in which waste management was one of the top two projects was characterized both by the largest number of SAFI project centers and high levels of ethnic homogeneity provides tentative support to both of these theoretical perspectives.

One possible interpretation of this finding is that the expectation of future NGO assistance and relatively strong social networks are necessary for civil society organizations to effectively use participatory planning processes to advance their own interests. The practical implication for civil society organizations like SAFI that are attempting to influence participatory planning processes is that it is necessary to either find ways to obtain and induce credible commitments from mobilized citizens and/or to leverage existing social networks and norms within communities. Conversely, for governments or donors seeking to avoid capture of community-based planning by civil society organizations, it may be necessary to ensure that the targeting and implementation of NGO projects are not used as pork barrel projects to reward supporters and punish defectors.

5.3 Effects of Mobilization and Participation on Project Allocations

The results of the preceding section indicated that although SAFI's mobilization did increase the level of support for solid waste management at LASDAP meetings, this increase was not sufficient to allow the organization to capture the planning process for its own purposes. This finding indicates that in this context, interest group theories of politics are not sufficient to fully explain the nature of NGO mobilization and citizen participation in community-based planning, at least in this context. In this section, I combine data from participant-observation with data from administrative records to test the observable implications of the remaining two alternative theoretical interpretations of the causal relationship between mobilization, citizen participation, and community-based local government planning.

As discussed above, the second implication is derived from the body of theories that predict that increased participation in local government planning meetings reduces the information asymmetry between citizens and government officials and increases the match between citizen preferences and the allocation of public projects. The third observable implication is derived from theories that predict that mobilization creates incentives for government officials to actively maintain the information asymmetry between themselves and incentives. If this is the case, mobilization will not lead to any change in the match between citizen preferences and allocated projects, but will lead to government interference that is less easy for citizens to detect and punish through monitoring. To test these two implications, I compared the fieldnotes from the community meetings with the administrative documents from the full county council meeting to code two types of measure: 1) the match between the projects requested by citizens and the projects included in the final budget request to the central government and 2) the specific nature of deviations between the types of projects requested by citizens and the final allocations by the county council. As in the previous section, both of these sets of measures are regressed on meeting attendance, instrumenting for mobilization, as well as on meeting attendance and mobilization alone.

Table 10 lists the top two projects chosen by the meeting participants in each ward, alongside the two projects that were sent to the central government for the same wards. What is striking about this broad overview is that there is only a perfect match between citizen-selected projects and final projects in two wards— one treatment and one control— out of the fourteen included in the sample for the experiment. In the remaining twelve wards, the final projects deviate from those chosen in the meeting in at least one of three ways: 1) at least one of the top two projects from the meeting is replaced by a project that was not chosen by the community; 2) the rank ordering of the projects is not consistent with the rank ordering chosen by the community; 3) only one project was chosen in the final list.

In the language of the conceptual approach developed above, these types of deviations do appear to vary with how visible they are to citizens who may be monitoring the government. The first two types of deviation are highly visible instances of the government choosing to implement projects other than those requested by the participants in the meeting, and any citizens who were there will know that the preferences of politicians or bureaucrats had influenced the list of the final projects that were allocated in the ward. In contrast, the third type of deviation sends a less clear signal about the government ignoring citizen preferences. That is, in order to detect an instance where the local government only funds one project, citizens have to be actively following up with the process of project allocation, procurement, and implementation to realize that one of the requested projects was not funded. The fact that such a small number of projects that match perfectly make it difficult to ascertain any effect of the participation induced by SAFI's mobilization on the probability of there being a match in a ward, or any interaction with ethnic heterogeneity (Tables 11 and 12). However, as Table 10 indicates, although perfect matches between meeting results and the final list are extremely rare, it is possible to disaggregate the measure in two ways: 1) examining at each of the two prioritized projects one-by-one and 2) simply assessing whether a project prioritized by the community is on the final list at all, regardless of whether its rank matches. Table 13 indicates that looking only at whether each ward's top priority projects match or were funded at all provides little additional evidence that the treatment had any effect on the probability of a match.

This pattern also holds when looking only at allocation for second-ranked projects (Table 14). Tables 15 and 16 both indicate that including ethnic heterogeneity in echoes this finding of no effect of mobilization-induced attendance on the likelihood of either the first or second-ranked projects matching those requested in the LASDAP meetings. In fact, column 6 of Table 15 indicates that in ethnically heterogeneous wards, mobilization actually reduces the probability that the community's top priority project was funded at all, running directly against the prediction that mobilization enables heterogeneous communities to overcome the collective action problems associated with monitoring public officials.

These results indicate that there is very little evidence that the SAFI project's mobilization in the randomly assigned treatment wards increased the match between the projects requested by meeting participants and the projects chosen by the local government. This finding indicates that in this particular context, mobilizing citizens to participate in community-based local government planning did little on its own to reduce the information asymmetry between citizens and politicians. One possible interpretation of this result is that the lack of an effect of mobilization on project match is due to flaws in the design or implementation of SAFI's mobilization campaign. Under this interpretation, these results do not actually provide evidence against the observable implications of theories emphasizing information asymmetries and accountability. If the mobilization intervention itself is ineffective for the purpose of reducing information

asymmetries, then it should be the case that a better-designed intervention would be effective at increasing the match between citizen-chosen projects and the final allocations by the local government.

However, an alternative interpretation of this pattern is that the mobilization of citizens is in fact effective in increasing the scrutiny under which citizens place politicians and bureaucrats. In this interpretation, government officials are able to respond strategically to this increased scrutiny by changing their interference to be less visible, which explains the outcome that mobilization-induced participation has no effect on the match between the projects requested by citizens and the final project allocations by the county council. This alternative interpretation of the lack of an effect of SAFI's mobilization on project match is consistent with the theoretical approach to mobilization and participation that emphasizes the dynamic interactions between power and institutions. As a result, examining the effect of treatment on the incidence of each of the specific types of deviations identified above makes it possible to distinguish between these competing interpretations and the alternative theories that undergird each interpretation.

Tables 17 and 18 show the effect of mobilization and mobilization-induced attendance on the probability of a ward having final projects that were not among the citizens' top priorities or were not in the order requested by citizens. As Column 3 of each table indicates, mobilization-induced attendance has a statistically significant negative effect on the probability of both kinds of discrepancy, with an increase in of 40 meeting attendees being associated with a 44 percentage point reduction in the probability of both kinds of malfeasance. Although the main effects of mobilization are relatively similar for both kinds of discrepancy, Tables 19 and 20 indicate that the two types of discrepancy are differentially affected by the interaction between mobilization and ethnic heterogeneity. In particular, the effect of mobilization on reducing the probability of the final projects being out-of-order is driven entirely due to the effect in heterogeneous wards, whereas the effect on the probability of final projects being outside of the top two projects suggested in the meeting is primarily driven by the effect in homogenous wards.

Although SAFI's mobilization had the effect of reducing the probability of the funded projects being outside of the ward's top choice or being out of order, Table 21 indicates that the treatment increased the probability of only one project being funded in the ward. The size of the effect indicates that increasing attendance by about 40 people increases the probability of wards only having one project funded by 44%, which is the same size as the mobilization-induced reduction in the probability of the funded projects being out-of-order or chosen from outside the list of high-priority projects. As above, this effect of mobilization and participation on the form of discrepancy interacts with ward-level ethnic composition, as mobilization in ethnically heterogeneous wards make the probability of only one project being funded much more likely (Table 22).

These results indicate that there appears to be a systematic relationship between SAFI's mobilization, citizen attendance at the LASDAP meeting, and the nature of observed discrepancies between requested projects and final allocations by the county council. Overall, these findings militate against the interpretation that SAFI's mobilization had no effect on the incentives facing local government officials and indicate that in this context, mobilization appears to have had the effect of changing the form of discrepancy. Moreover, the tendency of mobilization to reduce discrepancies that involve manipulations of the project order and increase discrepancies that involve funding only one project provides tentative support for the hypothesis that in the face of increased visibility, politicians will utilize strategies that help them to maintain their power. Finally, the finding that the interaction between SAFI's mobilization and ethnic heterogeneity increases the likelihood of a shift towards funding only one project appears to indicate that ethnic diversity does exacerbate the collective action problems associated with holding local governments accountable.

At the same time, several aspects of the design of the LASDAP mobilization field experiment make it necessary to exercise caution in interpreting these results. First, even in spite of the battery of statistically significant results presented here, the small sample size makes it necessary to exercise caution when interpreting these results, particularly with respect to the interaction between the randomly assigned mobilization and ward-level ethnic composition. Second, because the measures of project match and type of discrepancy were constructed using ward meeting observations and the final administrative documents, it is impossible to ascertain whether the changes in the projects were introduced by the county councilors or by the bureaucrats employed by the county council. Finally, an additional reason for caution is that although the results do indicate that the attendance caused by SAFI's mobilization had a statistically significant effect on the form of discrepancy observed in wards in the treatment group, the interpretation of these findings as confirming theories linking power and institutions relies on three important assumptions: 1) funding single projects is a less visible from of interference than manipulating the order of projects, 2) local politicians and/or bureaucrats are aware of the differences in visibility associated with different types of intervention, 3) there are no legitimate reasons why politicians or bureaucrats would override citizen preferences.

If these assumptions are violated, then interpreting these results as supporting the theory of institutions and power is not valid. In particular, one alternative interpretation that is observationally equivalent to these findings is that mobilization increases the probability that the projects selected in ward meetings are not feasible from a standpoint of technical viability or budget, which requires that politicians or bureaucrats make adjustments. To rule out this alternative explanation and to provide further evidence that mobilization by SAFI led government officials to find new ways to maintain their control over the LASDAP process, it is necessary to examine the patterns of projects chosen by citizens in treatment and control wards in greater detail and to combine that analysis with further in-depth qualitative research examining the interactions between citizens, civil society organizations, politicians, and bureaucrats.

6. Conclusions and Implications for Further Study

In summary, the results of the LASDAP mobilization experiment indicate that SAFI's mobilization program was effective in increasing citizen participation in ward consultation meetings, which in turn had an effect on the nature of discrepancies between citizen-requested projects and the final projects selected by the county council. This set of findings supports the overall theoretical framework outlined above that links mobilization, participation, and the outcomes of community-based local government planning, and in particular provides evidence that in this context, theories emphasizing the linkage between power and institutions provide the most leverage in understanding the linkage between civil society organizations, citizens, politicians, and bureaucrats. At the highest level, this set of findings confirms that participatory local government planning institutions are a hybrid of the types of institutional features that characterize localized collective action, community-based development projects, and representative democracy. Due to the hybrid nature of such institutions, explaining their performance requires theoretical synthesis and innovation that draws on the insight of diverse literatures in comparative politics, political economy, and political theory. In addition, combining the data from participant-observation and administrative records indicates that in this particular context, the increased citizen participation induced by an NGO-led mobilization had little effect on the likelihood of either interestgroup capture or congruence between citizen preferences and project allocations by the local government. This indicates that in at least some cases, NGO mobilization for participation in local government planning can understood primarily as an obstacle that merely diverts the influence of government officials, rather than increasing the balance of power between politicians and bureaucrats on one hand and civil society groups and ordinary citizens on the other.

This theoretical interpretation of the findings has important potential implications for the design and reform of participatory local government planning institutions in Kenya and beyond. Many community-based planning reforms are either explicitly or implicitly based on theories that assume that allowing civil society organizations and citizens to directly participate in the allocation of government resources allows for empowerment that is both valuable in its own right and which has an instrumental effect on the quality of public service delivery (Mansuri and Rao 2004, 2012). What the results of this experiment indicate is that in some contexts, institutional reforms that change the nature and scope of citizen participation in governance may not automatically change power dynamics, as politicians and bureaucrats may be able to use their formal and informal resources to react to the new institutions in ways that allow them to continue to pursue their own interests. In contexts in which this is the case, simply creating participatory planning institutions will not be sufficient to ensure empowerment of citizens and civil society. If empowerment is one of the primary goals of institutional reform, changes in formal rules will need to be coupled with sensitive analysis of localized power dynamics between citizens, civil society, politicians, and bureaucrats, and will then require in-depth mobilization and facilitation that challenges those structures of inequality and creates new norms and social practices that can be linked to participatory planning institutions (Miraftab 1997, 2004; Gibson and Woolcock 2008).

Despite the compelling theoretical and policy implications generated by this experiment, there are a number of important weaknesses that limit the inferences that it is possible to make based on this evidence. Even though the blocked-randomized design and large effect sizes made it possible to overcome some of the potential issues of statistical power associated with this kind of small scale field experiment, the rapid design and small budget of the experiment pose several concerns about the internal validity of the experiment. In particular, the blocking into pairs was conducted using qualitative data in a small sample, generating pairs that may not have been matched in a larger sample using more sophisticated matching techniques (Arceneaux et al. 2006; Imai et al. 2008). An additional inferential challenge comes from the fact that the theoretical framework developed here focuses on the causal chain linking mobilization, participation, and the outcomes of community-based planning, and the way that all of these linkages are mediated by ethnic diversity. Despite the focus of the theory on explaining causal mechanisms, the actual experiment itself only randomly assigned the first step of the causal chain, making it difficult to identify the precise effects of the intervening steps. To address these concerns, future replications of this study and other experimental research on the dynamics of mobilization and participation in communitybased planning institutions should utilize non-parametric matching and experimental designs that explicitly allow for analysis of causal mediation in a larger sample of wards (Imai et al. 2009; Imai et al. 2009).

In addition to posing potential problems for the internal validity of the experiment, the small sample also poses challenges for using SAFI's LASDAP mobilization experiment to make broader inferences about theory and policy regarding participatory local government planning institutions (Rodrik 2008). That is, based on this experiment alone, it is very difficult to assess whether the effects of mobilization on participation and project allocations are general findings that apply in all contexts, or whether these findings are driven by the interaction between the treatment and the specific formal and informal institutions associated with collective action and political participation rural communities in Laikipia, Kenya's local and national politics, and SAFI's own position within this web of rules and norms. In order to link these compelling findings to more general theoretical and policy debates, it will be necessary to engage in systematic extensions of this experiment that replicate the core intervention and measurement strategy in a broader sample of localities that include other localities within Kenya, communities in other countries that utilize other forms of participatory local government planning, and NGOs that vary with respect to their relationships with communities and the state and with respect to their preferred types of local public goods projects.

Despite these limits to the internal and external validity of the LASDAP mobilization experiment, the study has several important methodological and normative implications about the use of field experiments in policy-oriented academic research. In particular, the type of policy engagement that follows from the findings of this study-- direct, long term community mobilization and education-- are more closely associated with qualitative methodologies such as Participatory Rural Assessment than with randomized field experiments. This is in large part due to differences in the scale and scope of these two modes of development policy research. Participatory research methodologies are often focused on influencing policy at the hyper-local level by facilitating and motivating direct action within villages and neighborhoods (van der Riet 2008). In contrast, power calculations for randomized experiments often require that such studies incorporate a large number of villages or neighborhoods within the jurisdiction of one or more local governments or administrative units (Duflo et al. 2007). In addition, the type of quantitative evidence of policy effectiveness generated by field experiments is often considered to be most persuasive to politicians and bureaucrats, rather than ordinary citizens. As a result, policy advising and advocacy based on field experiments tends to be focused on persuading international, national,

and local policy makers to adopt a given policy rather than feeding directly into highly localized mobilization and collective action (Duflo and Kremer 2005).

The LASDAP mobilization and the broader set of field experiments implemented by SAFI showcases an alternative model for linking randomized evaluations to policy advising and advocacy. In particular, the long term relationship between myself as a researcher and civil society organizations and communities in Laikipia made it possible to rapidly design and implement an experiment that was closely tied to local norms and politics. In addition, SAFI's history of work in the Laikipia region made it possible to engage with communities in the type of in-depth manner typical of participatory research, but its relationships with international researchers and the county council made it possible to implement a blocked randomized experiment that provided a rigorous test of the effectiveness of its mobilization strategy. As a result of the LASDAP mobilization experiment, SAFI decided not to prioritize community mobilization for LASDAP meetings in subsequent years, but instead continued to mobilize and train community groups, while engaging in direct lobbying of the Laikipia County Council outside of the LASDAP process. SAFI's community mobilization and lobbying activities have both been linked to a cycle of experimentation and innovation; the organization's previous research activities are used to engage with communities and the local government, while at the same time supporting further evaluation of new programs and initiatives. One potential extension of this is that long-term field experimentation that is combined with community mobilization may be an avenue for precisely the kind of empowerment that is necessary for participatory local government planning and other types of governance reforms to be truly effective at transforming the relationship between citizens, civil society organizations, and governments.

Works Cited

- Acemoglu, D., and J. A. Robinson. 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions." *American Economic Review* 98(1): 267–93.
- Anderson, D. M. 2005. "Yours in Struggle for Majimbo'. Nationalism and the Party Politics of Decolonization in Kenya, 1955-64." *Journal of Contemporary History* 40(3): 547–64.
- Arceneaux, K., A. S. Gerber, and D. P. Green. 2006. "Comparing Experimental and Matching Methods Using a Large-scale Voter Mobilization Experiment." *Political Analysis* 14(1): 37–62.
- Baldassarri, D., and G. Grossman. 2011. "Centralized Sanctioning and Legitimate Authority Promote Cooperation in Humans." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108(27): 11023.
- Bates, R. H. 2005. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*. Univ of California Pr.
- Bruhn, M., and D. McKenzie. 2009. "In Pursuit of Balance: Randomization in Practice in Development Field Experiments." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*: 200–232.
- Chong, D., and J. N. Druckman. 2007. "Framing Theory." Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 10: 103–26.
- Duflo, E., R. Glennerster, and M. Kremer. 2007. "Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit." *Handbook of development economics* 4: 3895–3962.
- Duflo, E., and M. Kremer. 2005. "Use of Randomization in the Evaluation of Development Effectiveness." *Evaluating Development Effectiveness* 7: 205–31.
- Evans, P. 2005. "The Challenges of the 'institutional Turn': New Interdisciplinary Opportunities in Development Theory." *The Economic Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.*
- Fearon, J. D., M. Humphreys, and J. M. Weinstein. 2009. "Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion After Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-conflict Liberia." *The American Economic Review* 99(2): 287–91.
- Fung, A., and E. O. Wright. 2003. 4 *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance*. Verso Books.
- Gerber, A. S., and D. P. Green. 2000. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: AField Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 94(3).
- Gerber, A. S., D. P. Green, and C. W. Larimer. 2008. "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-scale Field Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 102(01): 33–48.
- Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2012. *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation*. W. W. Norton & Company.
- Gertzel, C. J. 1970. The Politics of Independent Kenya, 1963-8. East African Pub. House.

- Gibson, C., and M. Woolcock. 2008. "Empowerment, Deliberative Development, and Locallevel Politics in Indonesia: Participatory Projects as a Source of Countervailing Power." *Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID)* 43(2): 151–80.
- Green, D. P., and J. K. Smith. 2003. "Professionalization of Campaigns and the Secret History of Collective Action Problems." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15(3): 321–40.
- Grossman, G., and W. W. Hanlon. 2011. "Do Better Monitoring Institutions Increase Leadership Quality in Community Organizations? Evidence from Uganda." *Typescript*. *Columbia University*.
- Habermas, J. 2006. "Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research1." *Communication Theory* 16(4): 411–26.
- Habyarimana, J., M. Humphreys, D. N. Posner, and J. M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 709.
- Habyarimana, J. P. 2009. *Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action*. Russell Sage Foundation Publications.
- Imai, K., L. Keele, D. Tingley, and T. Yamamoto. 2011. "Unpacking the Black Box of Causality: Learning About Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Observational Studies." *American Political Science Review* 105(4): 765–89.
- Imai, K., G. King, and C. Nall. 2009. "The Essential Role of Pair Matching in Clusterrandomized Experiments, with Application to the Mexican Universal Health Insurance Evaluation." *Statistical Science* 24(1): 29–53.
- Imai, K., G. King, and E. A. Stuart. 2008. "Misunderstandings Between Experimentalists and Observationalists About Causal Inference." *Journal of the royal statistical society: series A (statistics in society)* 171(2): 481–502.
- Imai, K., D. Tingley, and T. Yamamoto. 2012. "Experimental Designs for Identifying Causal Mechanisms."
- Joshi, A., and M. Moore. 2004. "Institutionalised Co-production: Unorthodox Public Service Delivery in Challenging Environments." *Journal of Development Studies* 40(4): 31–49.
- Keefer, P., and S. Khemani. 2005. "Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services." *The World Bank Research Observer* 20(1): 1–27.
- Kibua, T. N., and G Mwabu. 2008. *Decentralization and Devolution in Kenya: New Approaches*. Univ of Nairobi Pr.
- Kipkorir, Benjamin. 2009. *Descent From Cherang'any Hills: Memoirs of a Reluctant Academic*. Nairobi: Macmillan Kenya.
- "LASDAP: Linking Citizens to Local Authority Planning and Service Delivery." 2009.
- Local Authorities Transfer Fund Act. 1998. http://www.kenyalaw.org.
- Mansuri, G., and V. Rao. 2004. "Community-based And-driven Development: A Critical Review." *The World Bank Research Observer* 19(1): 1–39.

- Mansuri, Ghazala, and Vijayendra Rao. 2012. *Localizing Development: Does Participation Work?* 1st ed. World Bank Publications.
- Miguel, E., and M. K. Gugerty. 2005. "Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya." *Journal of Public Economics* 89(11): 2325–68.
- Miguel, Edward, Katherine Casey, and Rachel Glennerster. Forthcoming. "Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Pre-Analysis Plan." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Miraftab, F. 1997. "Flirting with the Enemy: Challenges Faced by NGOs in Development and Empowerment." *Habitat International* 21(4): 361–75.
- ----. 2004. "Making Neo-liberal Governance: The Disempowering Work of Empowerment." *International Planning Studies* 9(4): 239–59.
- Mitchell, W. C., and M. C. Munger. 1991. "Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey." *American Journal of Political Science*: 512–46.
- Moe, T. M. 2005. "Power and Political Institutions." *Perspectives on politics* 3(02): 215–33.
- Olken, B. A. 2010. "Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia." *American Political Science Review* 104(2).
- Olson, M. 1965. 124 *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.* Harvard Univ Pr.
- Ostrom, E. 1998. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997." *American Political Science Review*: 1–22.
- Putnam, R. D. 2001. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.* Simon and Schuster.
- van der Riet, M. 2008. "Participatory Research and the Philosophy of Social Science." *Qualitative Inquiry* 14(4): 546–65.
- Rodrik, D. 2008. "The New Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, but How Shall We Learn?" *HKS Working Paper No. RWP08-055*.
- Roemer, J. E. 2006. *Political Competition: Theory and Applications*. Harvard Univ Pr.
- De Rooij, E. A., D. P. Green, and A. S. Gerber. 2009. "Field Experiments on Political Behavior and Collective Action." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 389–95.
- Sheely, Ryan. Forthcoming. "Regimes and Randomization: The Politics of Fieldwork in Contemporary Kenya." In *Politics of Fieldwork in Contemporary Kenya*, eds. Ariel Ahram and Paul Good. Lynne Reiner.
- ----. 2012a. "Institutions, Collective Action, and the Maintenance of Local Public Goods: Experimental Evidence from Rural Kenya." Harvard University. Working Paper.
- ----. 2012b. "Maintaining Public Goods: Institutions and Collective Action in Rural Development Projects." Harvard University. Book Manuscript.
- Smith, M. A. 2000. *American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections, and Democracy*. University of Chicago Press.

- Southall, R., and G. Wood. 1996. "Local Government and the Return to Multi-partyism in Kenya." *African Affairs* 95(381): 501–27.
- Widner, J. A. 1992. *The Rise of a Party-state in Kenya: From" Harambee" to" Nyayo!"* University of California Press.

Tables and Figures



Figure 1: The LASDAP Process Source: Ministry of Local Government "LASDAP: Linking Citizens to Local Authority Planning and Service Delivery"



Figure 2: Theoretical Framework Linking Civil Society Mobilization, Citizen Participation, and Community-Based Planning



Figure 3: Citizen Attendance at LASDAP Consultation Meetings, by Treatment Group



Figure 4: Citizen Attendance at LASDAP Consultation Meetings, By Treatment Group and Ethnic Composition



Figure 5: Community Group Attendance at LASDAP Consultation Meetings, By Treatment Group and Ethnic Composition

Ward Name	Region	SAFI Center Block	Total Number of SAFI Centers	Ethnic Composition	Treatment Assignment
Mumonyot	Laikipia North	No Centers	0	Homogenous	Control
Makurian	Laikipia North	No Centers	0	Homogenous	Treatment
Gituamba	Laikipia West	Some Centers	1	Homogenous	Control
Kinamba	Laikipia West	Some Centers	1	Homogenous	Treatment
Il Digiri	Laikipia North	Some Centers	2	Homogenous	Control
Loiborsoit	Laikipia North	Some Centers	1	Homogenous	Treatment
Marmanet	Laikpia West	Some Centers	3	Homogenous	Control
Muthengera	Laikipia West	Some Centers	2	Homogenous	Treatment
Mutara	Laikipia West	Some Centers	1	Heterogeneous	Control
Mukogodo	Laikipia North	Some Centers	1	Heterogeneous	Treatment
Muhotetu	Laikipia West	Many Centers	4	Homogenous	Control
Umande	Laikipia East	Many Centers	7	Homogenous	Treatment
Segera	Laikipia East	Many Centers	5	Heterogeneous	Control
Ethi	Laikipia East	Many Centers	6	Heterogeneous	Treatment

Table 1: Randomization Pairs and Assignment to Treatment/Control Conditions

Number of Community GroupsFemale Proportion of MeetingCitizens Participating in Meeting attendees that participatedAttendanceAttendingParticipantsPerticipating in Meeting(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)Mobilization40.143*1.143-0.00333.8570.019 (0.2097)Mobilization40.143*1.143-0.00333.8570.019 (0.120)North-Some Centers- Homogenous-21-1.5-0.04-70.047 (0.224)West/East-Many Centers- Homogenous51.500.009630.065 (0.224)North-No Centers- Homogenous51.500.009630.065 (0.224)
Community Groups Attendanceof Meeting ParticipantsParticipating in Meetingmeeting attendees that participated(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)Mobilization 40.143^* 1.143 -0.003 33.857 0.019 (20.297)Mobilization 40.143^* 1.143 -0.003 33.857 0.019 (21.662)North-Some Centers- Homogenous -21 -1.5 -0.04 -7 0.047 (37.972)West/East-Many Centers- Homogenous 51.5 0 0.009 63 0.065 (37.972)North-No Centers- North-No Centers- 51.5 0 0.009 63 0.065 (0.224)
AttendanceAttendingParticipantsMeetingthat participated(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)Mobilization 40.143^* 1.143 -0.003 33.857 0.019 (20.297)(1.262)(0.061)(21.662)(0.120)North-Some Centers- -21 -1.5 -0.04 -7 0.047 Homogenous -21 -1.5 -0.04 -7 0.047 (37.972)(2.360)(0.114)(40.527)(0.224)West/East-Many Centers- (37.972) (2.360) 0.009 63 0.065 North-No Centers- (37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
Mobilization 40.143^* 1.143 -0.003 33.857 0.019 (20.297) (1.262) (0.061) (21.662) (0.120) North-Some Centers-Homogenous -21 -1.5 -0.04 -7 0.047 (37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224) West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous 51.5 0 0.009 63 0.065 (37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
Mobilization 40.143^* 1.143 -0.003 33.857 0.019 (20.297) (1.262) (0.061) (21.662) (0.120) North-Some Centers-Homogenous -21 -1.5 -0.04 -7 0.047 (37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224) West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous 51.5 0 0.009 63 0.065 (37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
(20.297) (1.262) (0.061) (21.662) (0.120) North-Some Centers- Homogenous-21-1.5-0.04-70.047 (37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224) West/East-Many Centers- Homogenous51.500.009630.065 (37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
North-Some Centers- Homogenous -21 -1.5 -0.04 -7 0.047 (37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224) West/East-Many Centers- Homogenous 51.5 0 0.009 63 0.065 (37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
Homogenous -21 -1.5 -0.04 -7 0.047 (37.972)(2.360)(0.114)(40.527)(0.224)West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous 51.5 0 0.009 63 0.065 (37.972)(2.360)(0.114)(40.527)(0.224)
(37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224) West/East-Many Centers- 51.5 0 0.009 63 0.065 (37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
West/East-Many Centers- Homogenous 51.5 0 0.009 63 0.065 (37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
Homogenous 51.5 0 0.009 63 0.065 (37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
(37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
North-No ('enterg_
Homogenous -25.5 -1 -0.046 -10.5 0.054
(37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
West-Some Centers-
Homogenous 18.5 1.5 -0.095 16 -0.055
(37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
West/North-Some
Centers-Heterogeneous -37 -1.5 -0.041 -26 -0.153
(37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
East-Many Centers-
Heterogeneous -38 0 0 -25 $-0.0/1$
(37.972) (2.360) (0.114) (40.527) (0.224)
cons 40.000 6.000*** 0.450*** 07.071 0.605***
49.929 0.929 0.452 27.071 0.095
(28,704) $(1,784)$ $(0,086)$ $(20,625)$ $(0,160)$
R-squared 0.683 0.354 0.171 0.609 0.209
N 14 14 14 14 14
Standard Errors in Paratheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 2: Effect of SAFI Mobilization on Participation in LASDAP Consultation Meetings

	Meeting	Meeting	Meeting
	Duration	Duration	Duration
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	<u>OLS</u>	<u>OLS</u>	<u>IV</u>
Mobilization	1.116**		
	(0.407)		
Attendance		0.009	0.028**
		(0.009)	(0.012)
North-Some Centers-Homogenous	-1.375	-1.187	-0.791
	(0.762)	(1.073)	(0.952)
West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous	-0.045	-0.506	-1.476
	(0.762)	(1.150)	(1.112)
North-No Centers-Homogenous	-1.625*	-1.396	-0.916
	(0.762)	(1.080)	(0.968)
West-Some Centers-Homogenous	-1.295	-1.461	-1.809*
	(0.762)	(1.069)	(0.944)
West/North-Some Centers-Heterogeneous	-1.29	-0.958	-0.262
	(0.762)	(1.106)	(1.022)
East-Many Centers-Heterogeneous	-0.625	-0.284	0.431
	(0.762)	(1.108)	(1.027)
_cons	3.442^{***}	3.373^{**}	2.054^{*}
	(0.576)	(0.970)	(1.072)
R-squared	0.736	0.493	0.108
Ν	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Paratheses			
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01			

Table 3: Effect of SAFI Mobilization on Duration of LASDAP Consultation Meetings

	Attendance	Number of Community Groups Attending	Female Proportion of Meeting Participants	Number of Citizens Participating in Meeting	Proportion of meeting attendees that participated
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mobilization	53.400*	-0.6	0.055	45	0.011
	(23.856)	(0.740)	(0.062)	(26.485)	(0.155)
Heterogeneous	-14.8	-3.050*	0.101	-5.5	-0.086
	(43.825)	(1.360)	(0.114)	(48.656)	(0.285)
Heterogeneity and Mobilization Treatment					
Interaction	-46.4	6.100***	-0.202	-39	0.029
	(44.630)	(1.385)	(0.117)	(49.548)	(0.290)
North-Some Centers-					
Homogenous	-21	-1.5	-0.04	-7	0.047
	(37.719)	(1.170)	(0.098)	(41.876)	(0.245)
West/East-Many Centers-					
Homogenous	51.5	0	0.009	63	0.065
	(37.719)	(1.170)	(0.098)	(41.876)	(0.245)
North-No Centers-	~ - -		0.016	10 -	o o - (
Homogenous	-25.5	-1	-0.046	-10.5	0.054
West Some Contons	(37.719)	(1.170)	(0.098)	(41.876)	(0.245)
Homogenous	18 5	15	-0.005	16	-0.055
Homogenous	(27.710)	(1 170)	(0.09)	(41.876)	(0.245)
West/North-Some Centers-	(3/1/19)	(1.1/0)	(0.090)	(41.0/0)	(0.245)
Heterogeneous	1	-1.5	-0.04	-1	-0.082
U U	(37.719)	(1.170)	(0.098)	(41.876)	(0.245)
cons	43.3	7.800***	0.423***	21.5	0.699**
_	(29.217)	(0.907)	(0.076)	(32.437)	(0.190)
R-squared	0.74	0.868	0.483	0.652	0.211
N	14	14	14	14	14
	-7	-T	-7	-7	-T
Standard Errors in Pa * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *	rantheses *** p<0.01				

Table 4: Effect of SAFI Mobilization on Participation in LASDAP Consultation Meetings, Including Interactions With Ethnic Composition

	Meeting	Meeting	Meeting
	Duration	Duration	Duration
	<u>OLS</u>	<u>OLS</u>	<u>IV</u>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mobilization	0.696		
	(0.394)		
Attendance		0.008	0.013**
		(0.006)	(0.005)
Heterogeneous	-1.36	-1.379	-1.167**
	(0.725)	(0.787)	(0.530)
Heterogeneity and Mobilization Treatment Interaction	1.469	2.110**	2.074***
	(0.738)	(0.674)	(0.435)
North-Some Centers-Homogenous	-1.375*	-1.209	-1.101**
	(0.624)	(0.683)	(0.447)
West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous	-0.045	-0.453	-0.716
	(0.624)	(0.732)	(0.508)
North-No Centers-Homogenous	-1.625**	-1.423*	-1.293***
	(0.624)	(0.688)	(0.453)
West-Some Centers-Homogenous	-1.295*	-1.442*	-1.536***
	(0.624)	(0.680)	(0.444)
West/North-Some Centers-Heterogeneous	-0.665	-0.673	-0.678
	(0.624)	(0.672)	(0.434)
_cons	3.652***	3.445^{***}	3.088***
	(0.483)	(0.618)	(0.472)
R-squared	0.853	0.829	0.801
N	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Parantheses			
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01			

Table 5: Effect of SAFI Mobilization on Duration of LASDAP Consultation Meetings, Including Interactions With Ethnic Composition

	Treatment	Meeting	Meeting	Meeting	Meeting
Ward Name	Assignment	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3	Priority 4
Mumonyot	Control	Social Hall	Roads	Water	Dispensary
· ·					Waste
Makurian	Treatment	Roads	Water	Education	Management
Gituamba	Control	Roads	Water	Education	Social Hall
Kinamba	Treatment	Water	Roads	Education	Social Hall
				Waste	
Il Digiri	Control	Roads	Water	Management	Social Hall
			_		Waste
Loiborsoit	Treatment	Water	Roads	Education	Management
Marmanet	Control	Education	Roads	Social Hall	Water
Muthengera	Treatment	Education	Roads	Water	Dispensary
				Waste	
Mutara	Control	Roads	Water	Management	Security
	-	n 1	**	Waste	
Mukogodo	Treatment	Roads	Water	Management	Education
					Waste
Muhotetu	Control	Education	Water	Roads	Management
		_	Waste		_
Umande	Treatment	Roads	Management	Water	Education
0	(here here h	Decla	D'	TA 7 - 1	Waste
Segera	Control	Roads	Dispensary	water	Management
Fthi	Trootmont	Education	Ponde	Wator	Waste Management
Etill	rreatment	Education	Ruaus	water	management

Table 6: Results of LASDAP Consultation Meetings

	Number Supporting Waste	Proportion Supporting Waste	Number Supporting Waste	Proportion Supporting Waste	Number Supporting Waste	Proportion Supporting Waste
	Management	Management	Management	Management	Management	Management
	<u>O</u>]	L <u>S</u>	<u>O</u>]	<u>LS</u>	<u> </u>	V
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mobilization	5.857	0.028				
	(4.367)	(0.028)				
Attendance			0.162***	0.001	0.146***	0.001
			(0.041)	-	(0.043)	-
North-Some						
Homogenous	4	0.087	7.401	0.098*	7.064**	0.102***
	(8.169)	(0.052)	(5.003)	(0.050)	(3.391)	(0.034)
West/East-						
Many Centers-	1= 000*	0.000	9.66	0.06	o 496**	0.050
Homogenous	17.000 [*]	0.088	8.00	0.06	9.486**	0.052
North-No	(8.169)	(0.052)	(5.365)	(0.053)	(3.960)	(0.039)
Centers-						
Homogenous	0	0.017	4.13	0.031	3.721	0.035
	(8.169)	(0.052)	(5.038)	(0.050)	(3.449)	(0.034)
West-Some Centers-						
Homogenous	3.5	0.016	0.504	0.005	0.801	0.003
_	(8.169)	(0.052)	(4.986)	(0.050)	(3.364)	(0.033)
West/North-						
Some Centers-	0	0.044	F 002	0.064	F 200	0.070*
meterogeneous	(8 160)	(0.052)	5.992 (E 1E8)	(0.051)	(2.641)	(0.070)
East-Many	(0.109)	(0.052)	(3.130)	(0.051)	(3.041)	(0.030)
Centers-						
Heterogeneous	-1	0.018	5.154	0.038	4.544	0.044
	(8.169)	(0.052)	(5.170)	(0.051)	(3.660)	(0.036)
_cons	0.071	0.035	-8.336	0.011	-7.214*	0
	(6.175)	(0.039)	(4.524)	(0.045)	(3.821)	(0.038)
R-squared	0.599	0.532	0.854	0.578	0.851	0.569
N	14	14	14	14	14	14
Standard Errors	in Parantheses					
* p<0.10, ** p<0	.05, *** p<0.01					

Table 7: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Support for Solid Waste Management Projects

	Rank of	Rank of	Rank of
	Waste	Waste	Waste
	Management	Management	Management
	Projects	Projects	Projects
	<u>OLS</u>	<u>OLS</u>	\underline{IV}
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mobilization	-0.571		
	(0.429)		
Attendance		-0.012*	-0.014**
		(0.006)	(0.006)
North-Some Centers-Homogenous	-2.000**	-2.250**	-2.299***
	(0.802)	(0.715)	(0.485)
West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous	-2.500**	-1.887**	-1.767***
	(0.802)	(0.767)	(0.567)
North-No Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.803	-0.863*
	(0.802)	(0.720)	(0.493)
West-Some Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.28	-0.237
	(0.802)	(0.713)	(0.481)
West/North-Some Centers-Heterogeneous	-2.500**	-2.940***	-3.027***
	(0.802)	(0.737)	(0.521)
East-Many Centers-Heterogeneous	-1.5	-1.952**	-2.041***
	(0.802)	(0.739)	(0.524)
_cons	5.786***	6.333***	6.496***
	(0.606)	(0.647)	(0.547)
R-squared	0.782	0.832	0.827
N	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Parantheses			
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01			

Table 8: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Rank of Solid Waste Projects

	Number Supporting Waste Management	Proportion Supporting Waste Management	Rank of Waste Management Projects
	<u>IV</u>	<u>IV</u>	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Attendance	0.139***	0	-0.015***
	(0.039)	-	(0.006)
Heterogeneous	3.751	0.01	-2.122***
	(4.030)	(0.037)	(0.575)
Heterogeneity and Mobilization	1.00	0.044	0.105
Treatment Interaction	1.03	0.044	0.105
	(3.311)	(0.030)	(0.472)
North-Some Centers-Homogenous	6.910**	0.095^^^	-2.315^^^
	(3.400)	(0.031)	(0.485)
West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous	9.863**	0.068*	-1.728***
	(3.865)	(0.035)	(0.551)
North-No Centers-Homogenous	3.534	0.027	-0.882*
	(3.447)	(0.032)	(0.492)
West-Some Centers-Homogenous	0.936	0.009	-0.223
	(3.378)	(0.031)	(0.482)
West/North-Some Centers-	o 9(1		o oQ=**
Heterogeneous	0.861	0.026	-0.985**
	(3.300)	(0.030)	(0.471)
cons	-6.700*	0.022	6.549***
	(3.595)	(0.033)	(0.513)
R-squared	0.847	0.624	0.825
N	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Parantheses			
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01			

Table 9: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Support for Waste Management and Rank of Solid Waste Projects, Inluding Interactions With Ethnic Composition

Ward Name	Treatment Assignment	Meeting Priority 1	Funded Priority 1	Meeting Priority 2	Funded Priority 2
Mumonyot	Control	Social Hall	Social Hall	Roads	Roads
Makurian	Treatment	Roads	Education	Water	Roads
Gituamba	Control	Roads	Roads	Water	Cattle Dip
Kinamba	Treatment	Water	Roads	Roads	•
Il Digiri	Control	Roads	Education	Water	Water
Loiborsoit	Treatment	Water	Water	Roads	Education
Marmanet	Control	Education	Social Hall	Roads	Roads
Muthengera	Treatment	Education	Education	Roads	Roads
Mutara	Control	Roads	Dispensary	Water	Roads
Mukogodo	Treatment	Roads	Education	Water	•
Muhotetu	Control	Education	Education	Water	Roads
				Waste	
Umande	Treatment	Roads	Roads	Management	
Segera	Control	Roads	Dispensary	Dispensary	Roads
Ethi	Treatment	Education	Roads	Roads	Water

Table 10: Comparison of Projects Chosen in Consensus Meeting and Final Projects Forwarded to Ministry of Local Government by Laikipia County Council

	Match b/w	Match b/w	Match b/w
	Citizen	Citizen	Citizen
	Requests and	Requests and	Requests and
	Project	Project	Project
	Allocations	Allocations	Allocations
	<u>OLS</u>	<u>OLS</u>	\overline{IV}
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mobilization	0		
	(0.218)		
Attendance		0.003	0
		(0.003)	(0.004)
North-Some Centers-Homogenous	0	0.065	0
	(0.408)	(0.385)	(0.278)
West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous	0	-0.159	0
	(0.408)	(0.413)	(0.324)
North-No Centers-Homogenous	0.5	0.579	0.500^{*}
	(0.408)	(0.388)	(0.282)
West-Some Centers-Homogenous	0.5	0.443	0.500^{*}
	(0.408)	(0.384)	(0.275)
West/North-Some Centers-Heterogeneous	0	0.114	0
	(0.408)	(0.397)	(0.298)
East-Many Centers-Heterogeneous	0	0.117	0
	(0.408)	(0.398)	(0.300)
_cons	0	-0.216	0
	(0.309)	(0.348)	(0.313)
R-squared	0.417	0.496	0.417
N	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Parantheses			
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01			

Table 11: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Match between Requested and Allocated Projects

	Match b/w	Match b/w	Match b/w
	Citizen	Citizen	Citizen
	Requests and	Requests and	Requests and
	Project	Project	Project
	Allocations	Allocations	Allocations
	<u>OLS</u>	<u>OLS</u>	\overline{IV}
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mobilization	0		
	(0.283)		
Attendance		0.003	0
		(0.003)	(0.003)
Heterogeneous	0	0.128	0
	(0.520)	(0.487)	(0.326)
Heterogeneity and Mobilization Treatment Interaction	0	-0.022	0
	(0.529)	(0.416)	(0.268)
North-Some Centers-Homogenous	0	0.065	0
	(0.447)	(0.422)	(0.275)
West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous	0	-0.159	0
	(0.447)	(0.453)	(0.313)
North-No Centers-Homogenous	0.5	0.579	0.500*
	(0.447)	(0.425)	(0.279)
West-Some Centers-Homogenous	0.5	0.443	0.500*
	(0.447)	(0.421)	(0.274)
West/North-Some Centers-Heterogeneous	0	-0.003	0
	(0.447)	(0.416)	(0.267)
_cons	0	-0.216	0
	(0.346)	(0.382)	(0.291)
R-squared	0.417	0.496	0.417
N	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Daranthasas			
stanuaru Errors III Parantileses			
_ p<0.10, _ p<0.05, _ p<0.01			

Table 12: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Match between Requestedand Allocated Projects, Including Interactions With Ethnic Composition

	Top Priority Project Matched	Top Priority Project Matched	Top Priority Project Matched	Top Priority Project Funded	Top Priority Project Funded	Top Priority Project Funded
	OLS	OLS	IV	OLS	<u>OLS</u>	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mobilization	0			-0.143		
	(0.309)			(0.340)		
Attendance		0	0		-0.001	-0.004
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.006)
North-Some Centers-						
Homogenous	0	-0.006	0	0	-0.012	-0.075
	(0.577)	(0.586)	(0.392)	(0.636)	(0.655)	(0.449)
West/East-Many Centers-						
Homogenous	0.5	0.514	0.5	0.5	0.531	0.683
	(0.577)	(0.628)	(0.458)	(0.636)	(0.702)	(0.525)
North-No Centers-	0	0.007	0	05	0.495	0.400
Homogenous	0	-0.007	0	0.5	0.405	(2, 409)
West-Some Centers-	(0.577)	(0.590)	(0.399)	(0.636)	(0.659)	(0.457)
Homogenous	0	0.005	0	0	0.011	0.066
	(0.577)	(0.584)	(0.389)	(0.636)	(0.653)	(0.446)
West/North-Some Centers-						
Heterogeneous	-0.5	-0.51	-0.5	0	-0.022	-0.132
East-Many Centers-	(0.577)	(0.604)	(0.421)	(0.636)	(0.675)	(0.482)
Heterogeneous	-0.5	-0.511	-0.5	0	-0.023	-0.135
	(0.577)	(0.606)	(0.424)	(0.636)	(0.677)	(0.485)
_cons	0.5	0.52	0.5	0.571	0.542	0.749
	(0.436)	(0.530)	(0.442)	(0.481)	(0.592)	(0.506)
R-squared	0.417	0.417	0.417	0.244	0.224	0.185
Ν	14	14	14	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Par	antheses					
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, **	** p<0.01					

Table 13: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Match between Requestedand Allocated First Priority Projects

	Second- Ranked Project Matched	Second- Ranked Project Matched	Second- Ranked Project Matched	Second- Ranked Project Funded	Second- Ranked Project Funded	Second- Ranked Project Funded
	OLS	OLS	IV	OLS	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mobilization	-0.286			-0.143		
	(0.184)			(0.261)		
Attendance		0.001	-0.007		0.003	-0.004
		(0.003)	(0.005)		(0.004)	(0.005)
North-Some Centers-						
Homogenous	0.5	0.512	0.351	0	0.067	-0.075
	(0.345)	(0.413)	(0.377)	(0.488)	(0.483)	(0.393)
West/East-Many Centers-						
Homogenous	0	-0.031	0.367	-0.5	-0.664	-0.317
	(0.345)	(0.443)	(0.440)	(0.488)	(0.517)	(0.459)
North-No Centers-	0.5	0 515	0.010	0	0.091	0.001
nomogenous	(0.5)	0.515	(0.319)	(0, 488)	(0.486)	-0.091
West-Some Centers-	(0.345)	(0.410)	(0.383)	(0.488)	(0.480)	(0.400)
Homogenous	1.000**	0.989*	1.132^{***}	0.5	0.441	0.566
	(0.345)	(0.412)	(0.374)	(0.488)	(0.481)	(0.390)
West/North-Some Centers-						
Heterogeneous	0	0.022	-0.263	-0.5	-0.382	-0.632
	(0.345)	(0.426)	(0.405)	(0.488)	(0.497)	(0.422)
Heterogeneous	0	0 023	-0.27	0.5	0 621	0 265
lieterogeneous	(0.345)	(0.427)	(0.407)	(0.488)	(0.400)	(0.424)
cons	(0.0+0)	-0.042	0.408	0.571	0.277	(0.740*)
	(0.261)	(0.274)	(0.425)	(0.260)	(0.426)	(0.442)
R-squared	0.75	0.652	0.254	0.503	0.612	0 427
N	14	14	14	14	14	14
11	14	14	14	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Parantheses						
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, **	** p<0.01					

Table 14: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Match between Requested and Allocated Second Priority Projects

	Top Priority Project Matched	Top Priority Project Matched	Top Priority Project Matched	Top Priority Project Funded	Top Priority Project Funded	Top Priority Project Funded
	OLS	OLS	IV	OLS	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mobilization	0			0.2		
	(0.400)			(0.335)		
Attendance		0	0		0	0.004
		(0.005)	(0.004)		(0.005)	(0.004)
Heterogeneous	-0.5	-0.512	-0.5	0.6	0.496	0.655
0	(0.735)	(0.740)	(0.462)	(0.615)	(0.641)	(0.427)
Heterogeneity and Mobilization Treatment					、	
Interaction	0	0.002	0	-1.2	-0.999	-1.026***
	(0.748)	(0.633)	(0.379)	(0.626)	(0.549)	(0.351)
North-Some Centers-						
Homogenous	0	-0.006	0	0	-0.002	0.079
	(0.632)	(0.642)	(0.389)	(0.529)	(0.556)	(0.360)
West/East-Many Centers-						
Homogenous	0.5	0.514	0.5	0.5	0.505	0.307
	(0.632)	(0.689)	(0.443)	(0.529)	(0.597)	(0.409)
North-No Centers-						
Homogenous	0	-0.007	0	0.5	0.497	0.596
	(0.632)	(0.647)	(0.395)	(0.529)	(0.560)	(0.365)
West-Some						
Homogenous	0	0.005	0	0	0.002	-0.069
moniogenous	(0.632)	(0.640)	(0.287)	(0.520)	(0.554)	(0.358)
West/North- Some Centers-	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.307)	(0.329)	(0.004)	(0.350)
Heterogeneous	0	0	0	0	0	-0.004
C C	(0.632)	(0.632)	(0.378)	(0.529)	(0.548)	(0.350)
_cons	0.5	0.52	0.5	0.4	0.507	0.238
	(0.490)	(0.581)	(0.412)	(0.410)	(0.503)	(0.381)
R-squared	0.417	0.417	0.417	0.564	0.533	0.468
N	14	14	14	14	14	14
Standard Errors in * p<0.10, ** p<0.0	Parantheses 95, *** p<0.01	•		•	•	

Table 15: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Match between Requested and Allocated First Priority Projects, Including Interactions With Ethnic Composition

	Second- Ranked Project Matched	Second- Ranked Project Matched	Second- Ranked Project Matched	Second- Ranked Project Funded	Second- Ranked Project Funded	Second- Ranked Project Funded
	OLS	OLS	IV	OLS	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mobilization	-0.4			-0.2		
	(0.219)			(0.335)		
Attendance		0.001	-0.007*		0.003	-0.004
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.005)
Heterogeneous	-0.2	0.025	-0.311	0.4	0.633	0.345
Heterogeneity and	(0.402)	(0.522)	(0.453)	(0.615)	(0.609)	(0.466)
Mobilization						
Interaction	0.4	-0.004	0.052	0.2	-0.022	0.026
	(0.410)	(0.447)	(0.372)	(0.626)	(0.521)	(0.383)
North-Some Centers-						
Homogenous	0.5	0.513	0.343	0	0.067	-0.079
	(0.346)	(0.453)	(0.382)	(0.529)	(0.529)	(0.393)
West/East-Many Centers-						
Homogenous	0	-0.031	0.386	-0.5	-0.665	-0.307
	(0.346)	(0.486)	(0.435)	(0.529)	(0.567)	(0.447)
North-No Centers-	- -	0 -1-		0		
Homogenous	0.5	0.515	0.309	0	0.081	-0.096
West-Some Centers-	(0.346)	(0.456)	(0.388)	(0.529)	(0.532)	(0.399)
Homogenous	1.000**	0.989*	1.139***	0.5	0.441	0.569
Ũ	(0.346)	(0.451)	(0.380)	(0.529)	(0.527)	(0.391)
West/North-Some Centers-						
Heterogeneous	0	-0.001	0.007	-1	-1.003	-0.996***
	(0.346)	(0.446)	(0.371)	(0.529)	(0.521)	(0.382)
_cons	0.2	-0.042	0.524	0.6	0.276	0.762*
	(0.268)	(0.410)	(0.404)	(0.410)	(0.478)	(0.416)
R-squared	0.79	0.652	0.326	0.6	0.613	0.417
N	14	14	14	14	14	14
	- T	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7
Standard Errors in Parantheses						
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, **	* p<0.01					

Table 16: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Match Between Requested and Allocated Second Priority Projects, Including Interactions With Ethnic Composition

	Funding of	Funding of	Funding of
	Other Projects	Other Projects	Other Projects
	OLS	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mobilization	-0.429*		
	(0.202)		
Attendance		-0.002	-0.011*
		(0.004)	(0.006)
North-Some Centers-Homogenous	0	-0.037	-0.224
	(0.378)	(0.500)	(0.447)
West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.41	0.05
	(0.378)	(0.536)	(0.522)
North-No Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.545	-0.772*
	(0.378)	(0.504)	(0.455)
West-Some Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.468	-0.302
	(0.378)	(0.499)	(0.443)
West/North-Some Centers-Heterogeneous	0	-0.065	-0.395
	(0.378)	(0.516)	(0.480)
East-Many Centers-Heterogeneous	-0.5	-0.566	-0.906*
	(0.378)	(0.517)	(0.483)
_cons	0.714**	0.622	1.247**
	(0.286)	(0.452)	(0.504)
R-squared	0.636	0.382	
N	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Parantheses			
* $n < 0.10$ ** $n < 0.05$ *** $n < 0.01$			
p.0.10, p.0.03, p.0.01			

Table 17: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Funding of Projects Other than Those Selected in LASDAP Consultation Meeting

	Out-of-Order	Out-of-Order	Out-of-Order
	Priorities	Priorities	Priorities
	OLS	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mobilization	-0.429		
	(0.297)		
Attendance		-0.003	-0.011*
		(0.005)	(0.006)
North-Some Centers-Homogenous	0.5	0.441	0.276
	(0.556)	(0.641)	(0.502)
West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous	0	0.144	0.55
	(0.556)	(0.687)	(0.586)
North-No Centers-Homogenous	0.5	0.429	0.228
	(0.556)	(0.645)	(0.511)
West-Some Centers-Homogenous	0.5	0.552	0.698
	(0.556)	(0.638)	(0.498)
West/North-Some Centers-Heterogeneous	0.5	0.396	0.105
	(0.556)	(0.660)	(0.539)
East-Many Centers-Heterogeneous	0.5	0.394	0.094
	(0.556)	(0.662)	(0.542)
_cons	0.214	0.196	0.747
	(0.421)	(0.579)	(0.566)
R-squared	0.422	0.257	•
N	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Parantheses			
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01			

Table 18: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Out-of-Order Priorities

	Funding of	Funding of	Funding of
	Other Projects	Other Projects	Other Projects
	<u>OLS</u>	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mobilization	-0.4		
	(0.261)		
Attendance		-0.002	-0.007*
		(0.004)	(0.004)
Heterogeneous	-0.45	-0.313	-0.561
	(0.479)	(0.578)	(0.429)
Heterogeneity and Mobilization Treatment Interaction	-0.1	-0.489	-0.448
	(0.488)	(0.494)	(0.352)
North-Some Centers-Homogenous	0	-0.032	-0.157
	(0.412)	(0.501)	(0.362)
West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.422	-0.114
	(0.412)	(0.537)	(0.411)
North-No Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.538	-0.691*
	(0.412)	(0.505)	(0.367)
West-Some Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.472	-0.361
	(0.412)	(0.499)	(0.360)
West/North-Some Centers-Heterogeneous	0.5	0.502	0.507
	(0.412)	(0.493)	(0.351)
_cons	0.700*	0.606	1.024***
	(0.319)	(0.453)	(0.383)
R-squared	0.639	0.483	0.267
Ν	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Parantheses			
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01			

Table 19: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Funding of Projects Other than Those Selected in LASDAP Consultation Meeting, Including Interactions With Ethnic Composition

	Out-of-Order	Out-of-Order	Out-of-Order
	Priorities	Priorities	Priorities
	<u>OLS</u>	<u>OLS</u>	\underline{IV}
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mobilization	-0.2		
	(0.335)		
Attendance		-0.002	-0.004
		(0.004)	(0.004)
Heterogeneous	0.9	0.904	0.845**
	(0.615)	(0.625)	(0.393)
Heterogeneity and Mobilization Treatment Interaction	-0.8	-0.984	-0.974***
	(0.626)	(0.534)	(0.323)
North-Some Centers-Homogenous	0.5	0.451	0.421
	(0.529)	(0.542)	(0.332)
West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous	0	0.119	0.193
	(0.529)	(0.581)	(0.377)
North-No Centers-Homogenous	0.5	0.441	0.404
	(0.529)	(0.546)	(0.336)
West-Some Centers-Homogenous	0.5	0.543	0.569*
	(0.529)	(0.540)	(0.330)
West/North-Some Centers-Heterogeneous	0	0.002	0.004
	(0.529)	(0.534)	(0.322)
_cons	0.1	0.162	0.262
	(0.410)	(0.490)	(0.351)
R-squared	0.564	0.557	0.548
N	14	14	14
	-	-	-
Standard Errors in Parantheses			
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01			

Table 20: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Out-of-Order Priorities,Conditional on Ethnic Composition

	Prevalence of	Prevalence of	Prevalence of
	Single	Single	Single
	Projects	Projects	Projects
	OLS	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mobilization	0.429*		
	(0.202)		
Attendance		0.007^{*}	0.011***
		(0.003)	(0.004)
North-Some Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.361	-0.276
	(0.378)	(0.388)	(0.293)
West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous	0	-0.341	-0.55
	(0.378)	(0.416)	(0.342)
North-No Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.331	-0.228
	(0.378)	(0.391)	(0.298)
West-Some Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.622	-0.698**
	(0.378)	(0.386)	(0.290)
West/North-Some Centers-Heterogeneous	0	0.245	0.395
	(0.378)	(0.400)	(0.314)
East-Many Centers-Heterogeneous	-0.5	-0.249	-0.094
	(0.378)	(0.401)	(0.316)
_cons	0.286	0.037	-0.247
	(0.286)	(0.351)	(0.330)
R-squared	0.636	0.629	0.529
N	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Parantheses			
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01			

Table 21: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Prevalence of Single Projects

	Prevalence of	Prevalence of	Prevalence of
	Single	Single	Single
	Projects	Projects	Projects
	<u>OLS</u>	<u>OLS</u>	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mobilization	0.4		
	(0.261)		
Attendance		0.006*	0.007***
		(0.003)	(0.003)
Heterogeneous	-0.55	-0.485	-0.439
	(0.479)	(0.428)	(0.270)
Heterogeneity and Mobilization Treatment Interaction	0.1	0.455	0.448**
	(0.488)	(0.366)	(0.222)
North-Some Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.366	-0.343
	(0.412)	(0.371)	(0.228)
West/East-Many Centers-Homogenous	0	-0.329	-0.386
	(0.412)	(0.398)	(0.259)
North-No Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.337	-0.309
	(0.412)	(0.374)	(0.231)
West-Some Centers-Homogenous	-0.5	-0.618	-0.639***
	(0.412)	(0.370)	(0.227)
West/North-Some Centers-Heterogeneous	0.5	0.494	0.493**
	(0.412)	(0.366)	(0.221)
_cons	0.3	0.053	-0.024
	(0.319)	(0.336)	(0.241)
R-squared	0.639	0.716	0.709
N	14	14	14
Standard Errors in Parantheses			
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01			

Table 22: Effect of Mobilization and Participation on Prevalence of SingleProjects, Including Interactions With Ethnic Composition